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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
  
 J. David Smith contends that multiple conspiracy 
indictments have put him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 
The defendant was indicted in New Jersey for conspiring to 
defraud GTECH, his employer, through a kickback scheme.  On the 
same day, he was indicted in Kentucky for conspiring to defraud 
GTECH with a different co-conspirator, also through a kickback 
scheme.  After he was acquitted of the Kentucky charges, Smith 
filed a pretrial motion in the New Jersey prosecution to dismiss 
the conspiracy charges on double jeopardy grounds and both the 
conspiracy and substantive charges on collateral estoppel 
grounds.  The court denied his motion, finding that he had failed 
to make the required showing under United States v. Liotard, 817 
F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1987), and that the issues raised in the New 
Jersey indictment were not identical to those decided in the 
Kentucky trial.  
We will affirm.   
 
I.   
 All charges against J. David Smith stem from his 
employment with GTECH, a lottery service company located in Rhode 
Island.  Smith was the national sales manager for GTECH until 
 2 
December 1993, with offices at the Rhode Island headquarters.  He 
also maintained a farm and residence in Kentucky.  During the 
time periods covered by the indictments, GTECH provided services 
to the state lotteries of New Jersey and Kentucky, as well as 
other states. 
 Steven D'Andrea and Joseph LaPorta are New Jersey 
residents who owned and controlled three New Jersey consulting 
companies, Benchmark Enterprises, Inc. ("Benchmark"), Sambuca 
Consultants ("Sambuca"), and Production Group Incorporated 
("PGI").  Luther Roger Wells, Jr., was a Kentucky resident who 
owned Bluegrass Industrial ("Bluegrass") and Bluegrass Industrial 
Distributors ("BID").  BID ostensibly provided ribbons used to 
print lottery tickets.  Karen Smith, the defendant's wife, lived 
in Kentucky with her husband.  She owned International Marketing 
Concepts, Inc. ("IMC"). 
 The Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") began 
investigating D'Andrea in June of 1993.  Investigators had 
Benchmark corporate records, GTECH records, and Smith's Kentucky 
bank records subpoenaed.  By April 11, 1994, the investigation 
had produced information that prompted the New Jersey Division of 
the United States Attorney's Office to send Smith a target 
letter.  Smith was thereafter advised that the FBI's evidence 
indicated that he was involved in a kickback scheme to defraud 
GTECH.  Smith allegedly would arrange for service providers in 
New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Kentucky to be engaged by GTECH 
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and to be paid for non-existent or over-valued services.1  These 
service providers included Benchmark, Sambuca, and PGI in New 
Jersey, and BID in Kentucky.  In return, these service providers 
would send kickbacks to third parties in Kentucky designated by 
Smith.  These third parties included IMC and Billy Adams, a 
carpenter who frequently did work on Smith's farm.  When IMC, 
Adams, and the three other designated third parties received the 
"consulting fees" from the service providers in the various 
states, they would transmit the funds to Smith and his wife or 
apply them for their benefit.  According to an affidavit of 
Smith's counsel, the United States Attorney sought Smith's 
cooperation and threatened him with indictments in all four 
states if he failed to cooperate.  Smith declined to cooperate 
and indictments against him were simultaneously returned in 
Kentucky and New Jersey. 
 The federal grand jury in Kentucky returned a ten count 
indictment charging Wells and Smith with conspiracy to commit 
mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, aiding and abetting 
mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1346, money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and assisting in the 
preparation of a false corporate tax return in violation of 26 
U.S.C. § 7206(2).  The fraud counts charged Smith and Wells of 
defrauding GTECH of money and Smith's "honest services."  See 
                                                           
1
  Although the investigations uncovered activities in Texas and 
New York, Smith limits his double jeopardy arguments to the 
activities alleged in Kentucky and New Jersey. 
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Indictment in United States v. Smith, ¶¶ 6, 19 (W.D. Ky., 
September 29, 1994). 
 Allegedly, Smith authorized BID to receive 8% brokerage 
commissions on paper sales from RMF Business Forms, Inc., a New 
York corporation, to GTECH and the Kentucky Lottery Corporation. 
Wells set up BID for the sole purpose of receiving the brokerage 
payments.  Neither Wells nor BID provided services of any kind to 
GTECH or the Kentucky Lottery Corporation.  Smith had GTECH 
employees in Kentucky fill out false invoices from Wells 
requesting his 8% commission, which were then processed in Rhode 
Island. 
 When Wells received his payments, he sent a portion to 
IMC, Adams, and other designated third parties.  The payments 
were disguised as "consulting fees."  The alleged conspiracy 
lasted from April 1992 to February 1994, and a total of $31,000 
was purportedly kicked back to Smith and his wife during this 
period. 
 The Kentucky prosecution went to trial.  After the 
prosecution presented its case, the judge entered a judgment of 
acquittal on all the charges pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.  He 
found that (i) the record contained insufficient evidence 
indicating that GTECH lost any money; (ii) a violation of GTECH's 
intangible right to Smith's honest services could not support a 
criminal fraud conviction; and (iii) the government failed to 
prove that GTECH was unaware of the kickback payments and that 
the payments were unauthorized.  The judge found that the facts 
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indicated that GTECH had willingly paid BID fees for the purpose 
of generating goodwill, and no fraud had occurred. 
 The New Jersey federal grand jury returned a nineteen 
count indictment charging Smith, D'Andrea, and LaPorta with 
conspiring unlawfully to transport money obtained by fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, transporting such money in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, violating the New Jersey 
commercial bribery statute in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and 
laundering the proceeds of their fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956.  See Indictment in United States v. Smith (D.N.J., 
September 29, 1994). 
 Allegedly, Smith met with D'Andrea and LaPorta in April 
1992.  LaPorta agreed to introduce GTECH employees to 
representatives of the State of New Jersey to discuss 
implementing a new lottery game called "Keno."  Smith recommended 
to officers of GTECH that GTECH employ Benchmark as a consultant 
in New Jersey.  He eventually had $579,047 in consulting fees 
paid to Benchmark, and in return, D'Andrea and LaPorta gave Smith 
$157,000 in kickbacks.  Over the course of the alleged 
conspiracy, Smith also directed GTECH to pay consulting fees to 
PGI and Sambuca.  As in the Kentucky scheme, the consultants sent 
the payments to IMC, Adams, and other third parties in Kentucky 
designated by Smith, who then applied the balance for the benefit 
of Smith and his wife.  The conspiracy allegedly lasted from 
March 1992 to March 1994. 
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 The trial in the New Jersey case was scheduled to 
proceed in April 1995.  In pretrial motions, Smith raised double 
jeopardy and collateral estoppel as defenses to all the New 
Jersey counts.  Applying the analysis set forth in Liotard, the 
court found, without an evidentiary hearing, that the conspiracy 
charge was not barred because Smith had failed to make the 
required non-frivolous showing that there had been only one 
conspiracy.  Issue preclusion was found to be inapposite since 
none of the issues decided in Kentucky were presented by the New 
Jersey indictment.  Smith appeals the court's ruling on the 
conspiracy charge and denial of collateral estoppel on all the 
charges.  He does not appeal the ruling that the substantive 
charges are not barred by double jeopardy. 
 
II. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Pretrial orders denying motions to 
dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds are within the 
"collateral order" exception to the final order requirement.  See 
United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 61 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
dismissed, 498 U.S. 1075 (1991).  Consequently, we have appellate 
jurisdiction to consider Smith's appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Our review of double jeopardy challenges is plenary.  See United 
States v. Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d 923, 926 (3d Cir. 1988).  Since 
collateral estoppel as a bar to reprosecution is a component of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 
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445-46 (1970), and is an issue of law, see Swineford v. Snyder 
County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994), our review of the 
collateral estoppel claims is also plenary.  
 
III.   
 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall "be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Supreme Court has 
emphasized the importance of protecting individuals not only from 
double punishment, but also from being twice subject to trial: 
[T]he guarantee against double jeopardy assures an 
individual that, among other things, he will not be 
forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the personal 
strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal 
trial more than once for the same offense.  It thus 
protects interests wholly unrelated to the propriety of 
any subsequent conviction. . . .  [E]ven if the accused 
is acquitted, . . .  he has still been forced to endure 
a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to 
prohibit.  Consequently, if a criminal defendant is to 
avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby enjoy the 
full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy 
challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before 
that subsequent exposure occurs. 
 
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977). 
 Following Abney, we established in United States v. 
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1977), the procedure by which a 
defendant could vindicate his double jeopardy rights prior to 
trial.  We held that "when a defendant has made a non-frivolous 
showing that a second indictment is for the same offense for 
which he was formerly in jeopardy, the government must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there were in fact separate 
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offenses before the defendant may be subjected to trial."  Id. at 
332.  In allocating the burden of proof, the paramount 
consideration was the "impracticality of placing the evidentiary 
burden on" the defendant: 
Inmon would be required to prove facts establishing the 
charge of conspiracy to which he pleaded guilty and to 
prove facts establishing the second conspiracy as well. 
How he could do either, without access to the proof on 
which the government proposed to rely and without the 
ability to offer immunity to prospective witnesses, is 
not readily apparent.  Even after a trial on the first 
indictment, the defendant would lack access to the 
government's proof of the second offense. 
 
Id. at 329-30.   
 We have been keenly aware of the difficulty of 
vindicating double jeopardy rights prior to trial.  We have 
stressed that the possibility of making a non-frivolous showing 
must be within the reach of a defendant innocent of the charges 
and without knowledge of the evidence the government may put 
forth.  Were the threshold showing made any higher, a conspiracy 
defendant would be without a meaningful opportunity to protect 
his right to avoid exposure to a second trial for the same crime. 
These considerations define an important difference between an 
assessment of double jeopardy rights prior to an evidentiary 
hearing and after a hearing or full trial when we have the 
benefit of a developed record.  Compare, e.g., Ciancaglini, 858 
F.2d at 926-30; Liotard, 817 F.2d at 1077-79; and Inmon, 568 F.2d 
at 329-33 with, e.g., United States v. Becker, 892 F.2d 265 (3d 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Felton, 753 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1985); 
and United States v. Inmon, 594 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.) (affirming 
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denial of double jeopardy claim after evidentiary hearing), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979).   
 Although the "same evidence" test is normally used to 
ascertain whether successive prosecutions charge the same crime, 
in Liotard we recognized that multiple conspiracy indictments 
raised special concerns that the "same evidence test" might not 
adequately address.2  "The danger is that successive indictments 
against a single defendant for participation in a single 
conspiracy might withstand same evidence scrutiny if the court 
places undue emphasis upon the evidence used to prove the 
commission of the overt acts alleged." Id. at 1078.  We noted 
that "[i]t is the agreement which constitutes the crime, not the 
overt acts. . ."  Id. (quoting Young, 503 F.2d at 1076).  To 
address this concern, we adopted the "totality of the 
circumstances" test, which did not emphasize overt acts.  From 
prior cases of this Court that had implicitly used that test, we 
extracted four factors to consider when determining whether there 
was one or more agreements: (a) the "locus criminis" of the 
alleged conspiracies; (b) the degree of temporal overlap between 
the conspiracies; (c) the overlap of personnel between the 
conspiracies, including unindicted co-conspirators; and (d) the 
similarity in the overt acts charged and role played by the 
                                                           
2
  The same evidence test asks whether "the evidence required to 
support a conviction upon one of [the indictments] would have 
been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other."  United 
States v. Young, 503 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1974) (quoting 
United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973)). 
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defendant in each indictment.  Id.  If the defendant makes the 
requisite showing, he is entitled to a pretrial evidentiary 
hearing to adjudicate his double jeopardy claim.  Id. at 1077. 
 In applying the Liotard totality of the circumstances 
analysis, we have understood that the ultimate inquiry presented 
by conspiracy double jeopardy claims is whether there are two 
agreements or only one.  See Becker, 892 F.2d at 268 ("The 
critical determination is whether one agreement existed."); see 
also Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d at 927.  To that end, we have not 
applied the Liotard factors in a rigid manner, as different 
conspiracies may warrant emphasizing different factors.  See id. 
at 930 ("[I]t is neither wise nor possible to attempt an 
exhaustive listing of the factors that may enter into the 
totality of the circumstances test. . . .").  In Becker, the 
defendant was convicted in Pennsylvania of a conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute marijuana in Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, and Massachusetts.  He had a prior conviction in West 
Virginia for a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute 
marijuana, and argued that the West Virginia conviction barred 
the Pennsylvania conviction.  In this particular conspiracy case, 
we found important the fact that the conspiracies had different 
objects.  The object of the West Virginia conspiracy had been to 
manufacture and possess with intent to distribute.  In contrast, 
the Pennsylvania indictment alleged that the objects were to 
smuggle, store, and distribute marijuana.  "These were two 
different objectives and agreements, and hence two conspiracies." 
 11 
Becker, 892 F.2d at 268.  Although we noted that the time periods 
alleged in both indictments overlapped, such temporal overlap by 
itself did not prove one conspiracy.  Id.  Similarly, when we 
applied the totality of the circumstances test to successive RICO 
prosecutions in Ciancaglini, we found most important the fact 
that the indictments alleged different patterns of racketeering 
activity.  See 858 F.2d at 930.  One indictment alleged a pattern 
of illegal gambling and extortion; the other focussed on murder 
and drug distribution.  We noted that the outcome was sensitive 
to a different mix of factors:  "[U]nder our totality of the 
circumstances test, a more significant overlap of time, or a more 
substantial identity of overt acts or similarity in predicate 
acts could dictate a different result."  Id. 
 Finally, we must keep in mind that a primary objective 
of our jurisprudence in this area is to assure that the substance 
of the matter controls and not the grand jury's characterization 
of it.  Thus, for example, the fact that the Kentucky indictment 
here alleges a conspiracy to commit mail fraud while the New 
Jersey one alleges a conspiracy to transport in interstate 
commerce the proceeds of a fraud is wholly unimportant if the 
evidence indicates that there was but one agreement to defraud 
GTECH utilizing both the mails and the interstate transportation 
of funds.  E.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942); 
United States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310, 312 (3d. Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Morrow, 717 F.2d 800, 804 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 1069 (1984).  We must not allow the double jeopardy 
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clause to be subverted by artful pleading or by the selective and 
strategic reservation of evidence in one prosecution so that it 
can be used in a subsequent one premised upon the same agreement. 
 The government has argued here that the details and 
scope of the criminal conspiracies as revealed by a simple 
reading of the New Jersey and Kentucky indictments should control 
our inquiry.  We decline the government's invitation to look 
solely to the acts as alleged in each indictment.  Those acts 
are, of course, primarily the overt acts which the grand jury 
chose to allege in each instance.  Undue emphasis on the alleged 
overt acts is precisely the problem we sought to avoid when we 
adopted the totality of the circumstances approach.  That 
approach requires us to look into the full scope of activities 
described and implied in the indictments. 
 In Felton, for example, we looked not only to the overt 
acts alleged but also to aspects of the conspiracy implied but 
not emphasized or even described in the indictments.  The 
defendant Hathorn had already pled guilty in Florida to a charge 
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana when 
he was indicted in Pennsylvania as Felton's drug supplier.  The 
Pennsylvania indictment simply stated that Felton purchased large 
quantities of marijuana from Hathorn in 1980.  Prior to trial, an 
evidentiary hearing had been held following a successful non-
frivolous showing, but the court denied his double jeopardy 
claim.  We reversed, finding that testimony indicated that 
Hathorn was involved in one "continuing, albeit loosely 
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organized, conspiracy" to smuggle drugs into the country by plane 
and distribute them.  Felton, 753 F.2d at 279.  Hathorn and his 
co-conspirators had made at least four drug smuggling flights in 
1980 and 1981.  The smuggling flight that was the basis of the 
Florida indictment was one of these flights, and at the 
Pennsylvania hearing, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency 
linked the marijuana sold to Felton to another of these flights. 
We noted that these flights were very similar, all originating in 
Atlanta, picking up marijuana in Columbia, and returning to 
similar locations.  Id. at 280.  Had we not looked beyond the 
acts alleged in the Pennsylvania indictment, we would not have 
uncovered the operational and locational similarity of the 
conspiracies in which Hathorn participated.  Thus, we must look 
to the entire record before the district court in examining the 
totality of the circumstances to determine if the conspiracies 
alleged in the two indictments truly are different agreements. 
 
IV. 
 Using the Liotard factors as a framework for evaluating 
the totality of the circumstances, we have carefully examined 
Smith's double jeopardy claim.  He insists that the indictments 
paint a picture of a single, over-arching conspiracy in which he 
acted in concert with IMC, Adams, his Kentucky and New Jersey co-
defendants, and others to divert funds from GTECH in Rhode Island 
for the benefit of himself and his wife in Kentucky.  While we 
agree that the two alleged conspiracies are similar in location, 
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time frame, and the roles he played, Smith has failed to provide 
a basis for inferring that all of the conspirators were tied 
together into one conspiracy.  There is some overlap among the 
alleged conspirators, but he has shown no reason to believe that 
the New Jersey defendants and Kentucky defendants may have been 
committed to the same agreement. 
 "Locus criminis" is defined very simply as the 
"locality of a crime; the place where a crime was committed." 
Black's Law Dictionary 941 (6th ed. 1990).  Smith argues that the 
primary locations for both conspiracies was in Rhode Island, 
where GTECH's headquarters and his office were located, and where 
the funds were allegedly diverted, and Kentucky, where he 
allegedly received the kickbacks.  The government stresses that 
all the acts alleged in the Kentucky indictment occurred in 
Kentucky, and all those alleged in the New Jersey indictment 
occurred in New Jersey.  We agree with Smith that events 
underlying the New Jersey and Kentucky indictments commence and 
end at the same spots and that the geography of his alleged 
criminal activity is consistent with the existence of what he 
describes as an over-arching conspiracy.  Although the 
indictments focus on acts in different states, they both 
implicate important acts in furtherance of the alleged 
conspiracies in both Rhode Island and Kentucky. 
 With respect to the chronological component of the 
Liotard analysis, extensive temporal overlap is apparent from the 
record:  the New Jersey conspiracy spanned March 1992 to March 
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1994, and the Kentucky conspiracy spanned April 1992 to February 
1994. 
 Also, we agree with Smith that the government's 
evidence indicates he played a virtually identical role in the 
activities that the government characterizes as two conspiracies. 
In each instance, he used his influence as national sales manager 
to procure contracts or fraudulent sales for his alleged co-
conspirators.  He then used his relationships with his creditors 
and others in Kentucky to launder the kickback proceeds. 
 While we agree with Smith that these three factors are 
consistent with a single conspiracy, they are neither alone nor 
together dispositive in his case.  Two conspiracies may be found 
despite similarity in location, see, e.g., United States v. 
Macchia, 35 F.3d 662, 671 (2d Cir. 1994); Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d 
at 929, and extensive overlap in time periods, see, e.g., 
Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669-70; United States v. Brown, 926 F.2d 779, 
782 (8th Cir. 1991); Becker, 892 F.2d at 268; Ciancaglini, 858 
F.2d at 930.  A defendant may play a similar role in multiple, 
unrelated conspiracies.  See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 
774 F.2d 261, 273-75 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that organizer of 
two similar, contemporaneous loan scams could be tried for each 
loan scam conspiracy); United States v. Somers, 950 F.2d 1279, 
1282 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding two, overlapping conspiracies were 
distinct even though defendant acted as major distributor of 
cocaine in each), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 917 (1992). 
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 That brings us to the factor most critical in the 
context of Smith's case -- the extent of the overlap of personnel 
between the two alleged conspiracies.  Smith correctly points out 
that he and IMC and the other designated third parties in 
Kentucky played a role in the activities alleged in both the 
Kentucky indictment and the New Jersey indictment.  To this 
extent, there is an overlap.  But Smith's argument, we believe, 
misses a critical point. 
 An overlap in membership is useful to a double jeopardy 
analysis to the extent that it helps determine whether the 
alleged conspirators in both indictments were committed to the 
same objectives and consequently were members of a single 
conspiracy.  When the same people are involved in the activities 
which the government alleges to be undertaken in furtherance of 
two different conspiracies, it will normally be possible to infer 
that they were aware of each other, of each other's activities, 
and of each other's objectives.  When the activities are 
interdependent or mutually supportive to any degree, the 
inference becomes compelling that the participants are involved 
in but one conspiracy.  Even where there are participants in one 
alleged conspiracy who are not involved in the activities of the 
other alleged conspiracy, these inferences may still have 
persuasive force when the common participants predominate. 
However, in evaluating the degree of overlap-in-participants 
factor in a particular case, one must look to the circumstances 
of both the common participants and the participants apparently 
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connected with only one of the alleged conspiracies.  When the 
evidence indicates that the activities of the alleged 
conspiracies are not interdependent or mutually supportive and 
that there are major participants in each conspiracy who lack 
knowledge of, or any interest in, the activities of the other, 
this factor weighs heavily in favor of a conclusion that two 
conspiracies exist. 
 The necessity of looking to the circumstances of all 
participants in the two alleged conspiracies arises from basic 
conspiracy law.  A criminal agreement is defined by the scope of 
the commitment of its co-conspirators.  See generally Marcus, P., 
Prosecution and Defense of Conspiracy Cases, §§ 4:01-4:02 (1995). 
Thus, where a defendant is unaware of the overall objective of an 
alleged conspiracy or lacks any interest in, and therefore any 
commitment to, that objective, he is not a member of the 
conspiracy.  In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), 
for example, the indictment alleged a single conspiracy to obtain 
loans from the FHA using fraudulent information.  The evidence, 
however, showed that while a single individual, Brown, was at the 
"hub" of the scheme and assisted in the preparation of each loan 
application, the other individuals in each loan transaction had 
no interest in the success of any loan application other than 
their own.  As described in a subsequent Supreme Court case, the 
evidence in Kotteakos did not show a single conspiracy: 
Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was 
interested in whether any loan except his own went 
through.  And none aided in any way, by agreement or 
otherwise, in procuring another's loan.  The 
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conspiracies therefore were distinct and disconnected, 
not parts of a larger general scheme, both in the phase 
of agreement with Brown and also in the absence of any 
aid given to others as well as in specific object and 
result.  There was no drawing of all together in a 
single, over-all, comprehensive plan. 
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558 (1947).  "The jury 
could not possibly have found, upon [this] evidence, that there 
was only one conspiracy."  Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 768.   
 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Blumenthal found that 
the evidence showed a single conspiracy to market whiskey at 
prices above the legal ceiling price in a manner that would 
appear lawful.  Even though some of the multiple participants in 
the scheme were unaware of the identity or role of other 
participants, all were committed to a single, common objective. 
As the Court explained the evidence: 
All knew of and joined in the overriding scheme.  All 
intended to aid the owner, . . . to sell the whiskey 
unlawfully, though the two groups of defendants 
differed on the proof in knowledge and belief 
concerning the owner's identity.  All by reason of 
their knowledge of the plan's general scope, if not its 
exact limits, sought a common end, to aid in disposing 
of the whiskey.  True, each salesman aided in selling 
only his part.  But he knew the lot to be sold was 
larger and thus that he was aiding in a larger plan. He 
thus became a party to it . . . ." 
Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 559. 
 Following the law established in Kotteakos and 
Blumenthal, in numerous variance cases we have drawn a 
distinction between multiple and single conspiracies based upon 
the existence of a commitment to a single set of objectives.  See 
United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1216 (3d Cir.) (holding 
that "evidence of a large general scheme, and of aid given by 
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some conspirators to others in aid of that scheme" is sufficient 
to establish single conspiracy), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 
(1972); see also Reyes, 930 F.2d at 313; United States v. 
Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1109-10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 906, and 474 U.S. 971 (1985). 
 We have found this distinction between multiple and 
single conspiracies no less compelling in the double jeopardy 
context.  In Becker, we compared a conspiracy to grow and 
distribute marijuana with a conspiracy to smuggle and distribute 
foreign-grown marijuana and found decisive that "[t]hese were two 
different objectives" and "hence two conspiracies." 892 F.2d at 
268 (emphasis added).  In Liotard, we compared two conspiracies 
to steal different truckloads of goods from the same trucking 
company.  The government argued that the fact that the separate 
heists were arranged in distinct conversations proved two 
conspiracies.  We held, however, that the defendant had made a 
non-frivolous showing of a single conspiracy.  We noted, inter 
alia, that the conspirators in each alleged conspiracy were 
committed to a common goal.  "The . . . goal of each conspiracy 
was, in addition to the personal enrichment of the participants, 
the financial ruination of the alleged co-conspirators' employer  
. . . ."  817 F.2d at 1077.  We rejected the government's 
contention because once all the conspirators had agreed to the 
common objective, the organization of sub-plots would not be 
"indicative of a separate conspiracy."  Id. at 1079 n.8.  As 
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succinctly stated by the court in United States v. Mintz, "[i]n a 
double jeopardy analysis involving conspiracies, the court must 
determine whether the two transactions were interdependent and 
whether the Defendants were 'united in a common unlawful goal or 
purpose.'" 16 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 2723, and 114 S. Ct. 2760 (1994); see also Macchia, 35 F.3d 
at 771-72 (examining interdependence as one factor in double 
jeopardy analysis); United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1063-64 
(7th Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1077 (1994); 
United State v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 1007 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Of 
principle concern is whether the conduct of the alleged co-
conspirators, however diverse and far-ranging, exhibits an 
interdependence."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991).  Cf. 
United States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(discussing interrelatedness of several conspiracies). 
 The ultimate purpose of the totality of the 
circumstances inquiry is to determine whether two groups of 
conspirators alleged by the government to have entered separate 
agreements are actually all committed to the same set of 
objectives in a single conspiracy.  A non-frivolous showing of a 
single conspiracy will be made when the record reveals a degree 
of participant overlap, which together with other factors, 
permits an inference that members of each alleged conspiracy were 
aware of the activities and objectives of the other conspiracy 
and had some interest in the accomplishment of those objectives. 
When, as here, a defendant claims that there was a single hub and 
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spoke conspiracy despite the presence of spoke conspirators who 
lacked knowledge of each other's activities, a factfinder will be 
unable to infer the existence of but one conspiracy in the 
absence of evidence that the activities of the spoke participants 
were, to some degree, interdependent or mutually supportive. 
 In the context of this case, we must look to whether 
Wells and his companies and D'Andrea and LaPorta and their 
companies were engaged in any common activities that are alleged 
in either or both indictments or are otherwise revealed in the 
record, or if their respective schemes were interdependent in any 
way.  The answer to this inquiry is readily apparent -- there is 
nothing to indicate that the co-conspirators named in the 
Kentucky indictment and those named in the New Jersey indictment 
engaged in any common activities or that their respective schemes 
were interdependent. 
 The lack of common activities or interdependence is the 
root problem with Smith's position.  He gives us no reason to 
believe that the New Jersey and Kentucky conspiracies were 
interdependent or mutually supportive in any way.  He can 
identify nothing in the record suggesting that Wells was actually 
aware of D'Andrea and LaPorta, or vice versa, and he cannot point 
to any common activities engaged in for the benefit of all 
participants.  The co-conspirators in each state derived no 
benefit, financial or otherwise, from Smith's activities in the 
other state, nor was the success of the conspiracy in one state 
contingent on the success of the conspiracy in the other.  To the 
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contrary, what the record reveals of the economics of the 
kickback schemes strongly suggests that Wells had no motive to 
commit himself to anything beyond the receipt of his commissions 
and that the same is true for D'Andrea and LaPorta and their 
consulting fees.  From the lack of mutual awareness and 
interdependence, economic or otherwise, we can only conclude that 
each group of conspirators had an interest in and were committed 
only to receiving their own unearned compensation. 
 Smith also suggests that the indictments show that he 
may have been involved in a hub or core conspiracy that planned 
the subconspiracies in each state.  Such a core conspiracy 
conceivably could exist even where the subconspiracies are not 
interdependent except for the overlap in membership and common 
planning.  Put differently, he is suggesting that there may be 
three conspiracies, one core conspiracy and two or more 
subconspiracies, and that acquittal on one subconspiracy 
precludes prosecution on the others.  We agree that if Smith, 
IMC, and the other designated third parties in Kentucky 
conspired, they may well have been core conspirators in an 
interstate conspiracy headed by Smith.3  The possibility that a 
core conspiracy existed, however, does not change our conclusion. 
                                                           
3
  The current record would permit a trier of fact to infer that 
(1) the kickbacks paid by the service providers in both Kentucky 
and New Jersey were intended to, and did, benefit Mrs. Smith; (2) 
IMC received kickbacks from the service providers in both 
Kentucky and New Jersey and passed them on to, or applied them 
for the benefit of, Mr. and Mrs. Smith; and (3) Mrs. Smith was 
the sole principal in IMC.  Based on these inferences, we believe 
a trier of fact could further infer that Smith, Mrs. Smith and 
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 If Smith had perceived the opportunity to defraud GTECH 
through the submission of fraudulent invoices from service 
providers, and acting alone like Brown in Kotteakos, had 
independently recruited service providers in several states to 
submit such invoices, arranged for the payment of the invoices by 
GTECH, and received kickbacks from the service providers in each 
state, he and the service providers in each state, like Brown and 
each of the loan applicants, would have been members of separate 
conspiracies.  Under the principles discussed in Kotteakos and 
applied in subsequent decisions,4 the service providers in each 
state, assuming that they lacked commitment to the success of 
Smith's overall, interstate scheme to defraud, would have been 
members of distinct conspiracies, and Smith could have been 
prosecuted separately for each. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
IMC were aware of, and committed to, the success of an interstate 
conspiracy to defraud GTECH. 
4
  See, e.g., Robinson, 774 F.2d at 265, 273-75 (holding that 
"mastermind" behind two similar loan scams involving different 
sets of co-conspirators could be tried for both conspiracies); 
United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(holding that company participating in two price fixing schemes 
with different sets of co-conspirators could be tried for both 
because "[t]he participation of a single common actor in what are 
allegedly two sets of conspiratorial activities does not 
establish the existence of a single conspiracy . . . .  This is 
true even where the common actor is alleged to have directed both 
sets of activities") (citations omitted); United States v. Papa, 
533 F.2d 815, 822 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that defendant could be 
tried for two conspiracies with different co-conspirators because 
he "was the director of two unrelated chains distributing 
narcotics" and "the mere fact that he supervised each chain does 
not transform two separate conspiracies into one" (emphasis 
added)); see also Somers, 950 F.2d at 1282 (holding that cocaine 
distributor could be convicted of two, contemporaneous 
conspiracies to distribute cocaine in same locality where 
distributees and suppliers differed in each conspiracy). 
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 The question posed by Smith's possible participation in 
a core conspiracy is whether this conclusion would be different 
if the evidence were to show that Smith, while independently 
recruiting the service providers in each state, had secured the 
commitment of his wife, IMC, and perhaps other core conspirators 
to his overall, interstate scheme to defraud.  While we have 
found surprisingly little authority on the point, we are 
convinced that the answer is "no."  Because a conspiracy is 
defined by the scope of commitment of its participants, the 
existence of a master, core conspiracy would not change the 
character of the agreements with the service providers.  Each has 
its own distinct scope of commitment and membership.  Whether or 
not there was a core conspiracy, we perceive no reason why Smith 
cannot be prosecuted both for his conspiracy with the Kentucky 
service provider and for his conspiracy with the New Jersey 
service providers.  As Justice Stevens observed in United States 
v. Broce, the fact that there may be an ongoing, core conspiracy 
is not inconsistent with the prosecution of a member of that 
conspiracy for separate illegal agreements with others entered 
into in furtherance of the overall objective of the core 
conspiracy: 
[T]he continuous, cooperative effort among Kansas 
highway contractors to rig bids, which permeated the 
Kansas highway construction industry for more than 25 
years . . . was unquestionably a single, continuing 
conspiracy that violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1.  It does not necessarily follow, however, 
that separate bid-rigging arrangements carried out in 
furtherance of an illegal master plan may not be 
prosecuted separately. 
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. . . . 
 
 There is something perverse in the assumption that 
respondents' constitutional rights may have been 
violated by separately prosecuting them for each of two 
complete and flagrant violations of the Sherman Act 
simply because they may also have been guilty of an 
ongoing and even more serious violation of the same 
statute for more than a quarter of a century. 
488 U.S. 563, 580-81 (Stevens, J., concurring).  See also Dortch, 
5 F.3d at 1063 ("While it is likely that [defendants] only had 
one agreement with each other, that does not prevent them, as a 
partnership, from joining more than one conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine in the East St. Louis/St. Louis area.  '[T]he guarantee 
against double jeopardy does not insulate a criminal from 
punishment for subsequent offenses merely because he chooses to 
continue committing the same type of crime.'  West, 670 F.2d at 
681.").5 
 As we have indicated, a non-frivolous showing of a 
single conspiracy under Liotard's totality of circumstances 
approach is not a high threshold.  The defendant need only be 
able to identify alleged facts and other evidence which, if 
credited, gives reason to believe that any alleged conspiratorial 
activity was in furtherance of a single conspiracy.  Having 
considered the totality of circumstances in Smith's case, we 
                                                           
5
  This case does not present the issue of whether the 
government, having first prosecuted a defendant for an over-
arching core conspiracy, can then prosecute him for a 
subconspiracy with one who is not a core conspirator to 
accomplish one of the objectives of the core conspiracy. 
Arguably, this would be akin to a subsequent prosecution for a 
lesser included offense.  Since the Kentucky prosecution here was 
limited to the conspiracy to defraud GTECH in the transactions 
involving Kentucky invoices, we, of course, express no opinion on 
that issue. 
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conclude that he has failed to make a non-frivolous showing 
because there is nothing in the record that suggests that the New 
Jersey defendants and Kentucky defendants are tied together into 
a single conspiracy by a commitment to a single set of 
objectives.  Our conclusion is the same whether we examine the 
totality of the circumstances for a single conspiracy or for a 
core conspiracy with multiple subconspiracies. 
 
V. 
 Smith contends that under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 
(1970), the government is collaterally estopped from prosecuting 
him in New Jersey.  He argues that because the Kentucky district 
court found no "intent to defraud" GTECH on both the conspiracy 
and mail fraud counts, the government is precluded from proving 
any intent to defraud GTECH in New Jersey, defeating the 
conspiracy and substantive fraud charges set forth in the 
indictment there.  We are unpersuaded.   
 The findings of the trial judge in Kentucky were, of 
course, limited to the charges before him.  They were accordingly 
limited to the payments made by GTECH to Bluegrass and the 
illegal kick-back payments made by it.  The court concluded that 
the government had not proved that the payments were made in 
furtherance of a scheme to defraud GTECH.  While the government 
should not be permitted to attempt to contradict these factual 
findings in the New Jersey case, there is no reason to believe 
that it will attempt to do so.  Clearly, there is no conflict 
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between those findings and the facts alleged in the New Jersey 
indictment and, accordingly, there is no basis for not allowing 
the case to proceed to trial.6 
 
VI. 
 The April 5, 1995, order of the district court will be 
affirmed. 
 
                                                           
6
  Insofar as the conspiracy charge is concerned, the defendant's 
double jeopardy and collateral estoppel claims both turn on 
whether there is but one conspiracy.  Smith recognizes this fact 
himself.  In the section of his brief arguing for estoppel, he 
states that "[w]hen one considers that the Government fragmented 
the single alleged fraud into two separate indictments for 
tactical reasons, the acquittal in Kentucky was in reality an 
acquittal for the whole fraud, no matter how the Government 
divided up the charge."  Appellant's Brief at 36-37. As we have 
indicated, we perceive no bar to the government's proceeding to 
attempt to prove the New Jersey conspiracy. 
